Suchergebnisse

L'observation de la construction politique de nouvelles institutions judiciaires transnationales permet d'éclairer un usage de la notion de culture juridique que l'on peut appeler dramaturgique. Cet article explore cet usage dans la négociation, par une oligarchie collégiale de juges et avocats d'affaires, harmonisateurs réunis en « conclave », d'un nouveau régime de la propriété intellectuelle en Europe au moment de la construction d'une juridiction unifiée du brevet unitaire. L'analyse de controverses entre ces entrepreneurs judiciaires, de la sélection de leurs leaders institutionnels ex ante , ainsi que de la manière dont ils représentent leurs compromis et sacrifices dans la négociation fait apparaître que les enjeux économiques, bien plus que les cultures juridiques au sens patrimonial, structurent cet usage dramaturgique.

Abstract
This picture, produced by Julien Brailly et al. (2016) and David Schoch (2020), visualizes multilevel networks of individuals and organizations.

Abstract
This paper is the written text underlying the keynote presentation at the Sunbelt XXXVIII in Utrecht, 2018. It presents a neo-structural approach to social processes in the organizational society and the usefulness of the analyses of multilevel networks to understand how we navigate these processes and are made aware of them when we face cooperation dilemmas. Empirical illustrations look at how multilevel networks and relational infrastructures are useful to research a process such as coopetitive learning in science, business and government. A conclusion focuses on the role of multilevel relational infrastructures in institutional entrepreneurship, social change and politics, as well as on our responsibility to develop our knowledge of these social processes and multilevel relational infrastructures as open science.

O colóquio Recherche & Régulation 2015 mostrou que a Escola da Regulação, mais frequentemente reconhecida por
suas teorias macroeconômicas, vem dando cada vez mais atenção à variedade de espaços nos quais se confrontam
formas de regulação, principalmente ao nível meso do ponto de vista econômico e social. Esta contribuição esboça
uma perspectiva capaz de mobilizar os olhares cruzados da Teoria da Regulação e de uma Sociologia institucionalista
e neoestrutural ao propor uma abordagem do trabalho político que incorpora a análise das infraestruturas
relacionais dinâmicas e multiníveis. Estas infraestruturas, que os atores coletivos organizados constroem, lhes permitem
defender e promover seus interesses regulatórios, assim como fazem funcionar as instituições existentes ou
fazem emergir instituições novas. O exemplo da construção contemporânea de um novo regime europeu de propriedade
intelectual (através da Jurisdição Unificada de Patentes europeia) é utilizado para ilustrar possíveis objetos
sobre os quais este olhar cruzado poderia se dirigir proveitosamente.
Palavras-chave: Infraestruturas Relacionais. Jurisdição Unificada de Patentes Europeia. Oligarquia Colegial. Redes
Sociais e Organizacionais.

Abstract
This paper is the text prepared for the keynote address of the EUSN 2017 conference in Mainz, Germany. A short presentation of concepts reflects in part the foundations of neo-structural sociology (NSS) and its use of social and organisational network analyses, combined with other methodologies, to better understand the roles of structure and culture in individual and collective agency. The presentation shows how NSS accounts for institutional change by focusing on the importance of combined relational infrastructures and rhetorics. Specific characteristics of institutional entrepreneurs who punch above their weight in institutionalization processes are introduced for that purpose, particularly the importance of multi-status oligarchs, status heterogeneity, high-status inconsistencies, collegial oligarchies, conflicts of interests and rhetorics of relative/false sacrifice. Two empirical examples illustrate this approach. The first case focuses on a network study of the Commercial Court of Paris, a 450-year-old judicial institution. The second case focuses on a network study of a field-configuring event (the so-called Venice Forum) lobbying for the emergence of a new European jurisdiction, the Unified Patent Court, and its attempt to create a common intellectual property regime for the continent. For sociologists, both examples involve "studying up": they are cases of public/private joint regulation of markets bringing together these ingredients of institutionalization. The conclusion suggests future lines of research that NSS opens for the study of institutionalization, in particular using the dynamics of multi-level networks. One of the main issues raised by this approach is its contribution to the study of democratic deficits in a period of intense institutional change in Europe.

Au cours des deux dernières décennies, la sociologie néo-structurale a développé une théorie de l'action collective basée sur l'observation et la modélisation des infrastructures relationnelles et des processus sociaux génériques (solidarités et exclusions, apprentissages et socialisations, régulation et institutionnalisation, contrôle social et résolution de conflits) qui aident les membres des collectifs organisés à gérer les dilemmes de leur action commune. Cette approche a laissé ouverte la question des déterminants macrosociaux de ces formes de coordination et de discipline sociale que les membres considèrent comme légitimes. Dans cet article nous abordons la question de ces déterminants en théorisant les mécanismes de co-constitution des niveaux macro et méso. Nous proposons ici de partir des phénomènes de mobilité et de turnover relationnel comme analyseurs de l'articulation ou de la co-évolution entre stratification et organisation, entre positions et processus, pour aboutir à une approche sociologique des coûts sociaux associés à chaque forme d'action collective. Nous appelons ces coûts sociaux, pour rester cohérents avec ce point de départ marqué par la temporalité, des « coûts de synchronisation » entre dynamiques propres aux niveaux d'action collective superposés qui se co-constituent en co-évoluant. Cette approche est associée de près aux récents travaux sur l'analyse dynamique des réseaux multi-niveaux, i.e. des systèmes articulant des niveaux d'action collective distincts et superposés, qui permettent d'envisager des mesures de ces coûts de synchronisation et les inégalités de leur distribution, notamment en identifiant et en reconnaissant l'importance des formes sociales de niveaux intermédiaires, entre réseaux interpersonnels et réseaux inter-organisationnels, qui sont transformées en organisations formelles par les acteurs sociaux en quête de pouvoir et d'« outils ayant une vie propre » (Selznick). Cette exploration aboutit à des suggestions concernant l'émergence de nouvelles formes de coordination dans divers domaines d'action collective (entreprises, associations, administrations publiques, marchés, industries).

This paper looks at dialogue and collective learning across borders through personal networks of judges. We focus on judges participating in the Venice Forum, bringing together European patent judges involved in institutional lobbying for the construction of a European Patent Court. Empirical observation shows that personal networks of discussion with foreign judges, reading of their work and references to their decisions do exist in this milieu and can be mapped. Our network study shows that judges from some European countries are more active in this dialogue than judges from other countries. The learning process is driven, to some extent, by a small subset of super-central judges who frame this dialogue and can be considered to be opinion leaders in this social milieu. We measure a strong level of consensus among the judges on several controversial issues surrounding the procedure of a possible future European Patent Court. But strong differences between them remain. Dialogue and collective learning do not, by themselves, lead to convergence towards a uniform position in these controversies.

Conflicts of interests are often dealt with by arguing that individuals, not institutions, are responsible for behaving unethically. In fact, institutions often push individuals to behave unethically. Individuals would need to be heroes to behave differently. This is particularly visible in organizations whose members are professionals; as brokers and boundary spanners, they use conflicts of interests to increase the power of their firm. Organizations cover themselves against accusations of unethical behavior by introducing formal organizational separations between their members, replicating inside the organization the boundaries that reflect external conflict. An example of such organizational devices are provided by Chinese walls. Using a network study of a New Eng- land corporate law firm, I look into the black box of such organizations and show that it is impossible for members to respect such Chinese walls unless they are heroes. The question arising from this analysis is, therefore, whether or not it is time for such professional firms to shrink to greatness. If members cannot be expected to be heroes, should their institutions not be redesigned so as to prevent unethical behavior without counting on their heroism?